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ABSTPJ\CT
REGULATOR SELECTIOri AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
Patrick C. Mann
and
Walter J. Primeaux, Jr.
Increasing electricity prices have recently intensified concern re-
garding the effectiveness of the regulatory process. In at least three
states (Illinois, Michigan, and West Virginia), questions are presently
being raised about the effectiveness of elected public utility regulators
relative to those commissioners who are appointed. The central purpose
of this article is to determine whether elected or appointed regulators
exert the strongest influence on electricity prices paid by residential,
commercial, and industrial consumers.
Cross-sectional regression equations were conducted for 1967, 1973,
and 1979. The 1967 data produced no evidence of any constraining influ-
ence on electricity rates by elected regulators, relative to appointed
regulators. The 1973 and 1979 data, however, indicated a dampening ef-
fect by elected regulators on some electricity rates. This trend over
time toward a some.'/hat stronger association between selection method and
electricity rates tends to support the hypothesis that regulatory arrange-
ment had a lesser impact on rates in the past era of passive regulation
than iu has had in the recent decade of more active reculation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
External forces are challenging the adequacy of traditional regula-
tory objectives such as control of earnings (prevention of monopoly
profits), control of prices (prevention of excessive price discrimination),
and control of service (Trebing, 1977). These external stimuli (high
rates of inflation, increasing consumer militancy, decreasing supplies of
inexpensive fuel, and increasing environmental concern) are responsible
for expanded criticism of and lessened public credibility in the perfor-
mance of state regulatory commissions. As a result, regulators have been
forced to consider nev; issues, examine broadened regulatory objectives,
and implement some regulatory innovations. In brief, regulatory reaction
to the external pressures have induced regulators to alter behavior and
practices. In this context, a relevant (and unresolved) topic is whether
the method of regulator selection influences rate levels and rate struc-
tures. This research, in examining regulator selection, is an attempt
to acquire more information on how public utility pricing decisions are
made--i.e., what specific factors influence regulatory decisions and the
regulatory process?
The analysis herein is based on the premise that public utility rates
cannot be totally explained by cost and other narrowly-defined factors.
The regulatory process is inherently a political process v/hcse outcomes
vary with certain political variables. In this analysis, we implicitly
presume that public utilities and their consumers are relatively homoge-
neous groups seeking to maximize benefits (or minimize losses) via the
regulatory process. We view public utility regulation in the context of
conflicting interest groups with regulators subject to political pressures
from these groups. Factors such as the method of commissioner selection
are presumed to affect the relative benefits (and losses) among the two
primary adversary groups, producers and consumers.
In brief, regulators are presumed to be more than just mediators be-
tween producers and consumers--i .e
.
, they act in their self-interest to
maximize their preference functions. Specifically, we hypothesize that
directly elected regulators (reflecting relatively higher voter input to
regulatory decision-making) permit lower electricity prices as compared
to appointed regulators (reflecting relatively lovver voter input). We hy-
pothesize that elected regulators will reflect strong opposition to rate
increases while appointed regulators will provide lesser opposition. In
sum, we hypothesize that regulatory arrangement affects the regulatory
outcome.
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' II. PRIOR RESEARCH
It is apparent the actual regulatory environment is much more com-
plex than most of the theoretical literature suggests; and that, as Jos-
kow (1973) suggested, actual understanding of the process can be enhanced
by broadening the analytical focus (beyond that of neo-classical eco-
nomics) to incorporate behavioral matters. To create a conceptual frame-
work for our anal^/sis of regulator selection and electricity prices, we
exaniine two subsets of the regulatory 1 i terature--theories of economic
regulation and the impacts of regulation.
There are several ways of categorizing the different theories that
have recently emerged, both to replace the traditional public interest
theory of regulation and to explain why some interest groups may receive
preferential treatment from regulatory commissions. Primeaux and 'lei son
(1930) employed two broad categories: the benefit theory of regulation,
which asserts that various interest groups control or "capture" the regu-
latory process; and the wealth redistribution theory of regulation which
emphasizes that regulation cannot avoid cross subsidization across user
classes. Trebing (1980, 1981) used similar categories: the capture
theory; the coalition building theory (regulators via cross subsidization
form political coalitions); and the equity-stability theory in which regu-
latory agencies act to protect the public from the direct effects of mar-
ket forces and in which equity considerations dominate efficiency goals.
The capture theory and its salient characteristics are found in Stig-
ler (1971). He asserted that regulation is generally captured by the reg-
ulated industry and is operated primarily for its benefit. However, Stig-
ler acknowledged the potential for capture by other politically effective
groups; he also allows for the non-capture of regulators; that is, numer-
ous limitations exist in the acquisition of political benefits from cap-
turing regulators (e.g., the capture process is expensive). In essence,
the benefit theory of regulation has numerous variations producing differ-
ent conclusions as to the favored interest group. Spann (1975) noted tnat
even if regulato>-s do not explicitly seek to benefit oarticular groups.
the lag effects inherent in the regulatory process imply a capture theory
of regulation. During periods of low rates of inflation (and/or high
rates of input productivity), regulatory agencies will appear to be cap-
tured by the regulated firms. Conversely, during periods of high rates
of inflation, etc., regulators will appear to be captured by consumers.
Since the lags inherent in the regulatory process can impose both costs
and benefits on various interest groups, these affected groups may atter^.pt
to change regulation to their advantage.
An exposition of the wealth redistribution theory of regulation is
.
found in Posner (1974). Regulatory behavior is influenced by various co-
alitions of politically effective interest groups (e.g., regulated firms
and large industrial customers). Thus, regulation is perceived as a sys-
tem of public finance (Posner, 1971), facilitated by internal cross sub-
sidization. The regulated firm is allowed to provide some services at
prices less than actual cost by providing other services at prices ex-
ceeding costs. Although Posner argued that this taxation-subsidization
by regulation is not explained by the capture theory of regulation, he
does not adequately explain why some groups are subsidy recipients and
why others are taxation victims, except to note that the cross subsidiza-
tion is generally compatible with the objectives of the regulators.
The capture theory of regulation is not necessarily in conflict with
the wealth redistribution theory of regulation. The form.er focuses on
regulators serving the interests of politically effective groups; regula-
tors selectively favor certain interest groups. The latter focuses on
regulation as a vehicle for redistributing wealth among interest groups.
Stigler and Posner concur that regulators do not exclusively serve a
single interest group, but instead make continuous decisions over tirre
regarding whom to favor (Peltzman, 1976). In both theories, regulators
selectively engage in cross discrimination among competing interest groups
A relevant question is whether the existence of regulation makes a
difference regarding variables such as price. Stigler and Friedland
(1962) found, for 1912-1937, that regulation per se had no effect on aver-
age electricity rates and had only minimal effect on electricity rate
structures. The regulatory effect was subordinate to several economic
characteristics (e.g., system scale) exerting important influences on elec-
tricity rates. Jackson (1969), in a similar analysis for 1940-1960, found
that regulatory variables added little to the explanatory power of an
electricity price equation, except for residential price in 1960. The
em.ercence of regulation as an important factor in the terminal year is
attributed to a change in the regulatory environment. Historically, due
to economies of scale, relatively stable input prices, and technological
improvements, the trend of electric utility costs has been downward. In
recent decades, due to increasing fuel and construction costs and the par-
tial exhaustion of economies of scale, the cost trend has been reversed.
This reversal has altered the relationship between the regulated firms,
consumers, and regulators. It can be argued that regulation is more ef-
fective in the context of increasing costs than during periods of stable
or decl ining costs.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF REGULATORY ARRAHGEriENT
The regulatory process involves two primary participants (the recu-
lated firms and the regulators), as well as other potential participants
6(e.g., consumer intervenors)". In this context, the regulators seek to
minimize conflict and have utility functions which they seek to maximize
given the costs-rewards confronting them (Hilton, 1972). The recent co-
incidence of increased public utility rate increase requests with in-
creasing environmental concern, increasing consumer militancy, and energy
shortages has placed substantial pressure on regulators. Therefore, an
interesting question that emerges is whether the mode of regulator selec-
tion has an effect on electricity pricing. One conjectures that this as-
pect of regulatory arrangement had little impact on electricity prices in
the era of generally passive regulation (pre-1970) but has had more impact
on electricity prices in the recent era of more active regulation.
Joskow (1972) constructed a model which indicated that, although cap-
ital costs are an important component of allowed rates of return for elec-
tric utilities, regulatory comimissions are influenced by other factors.
These factors include size and reasonableness of the rate of return re-
quest, presence of intervenors (i.e., allowed rates of return were in-
versely related to the extent of intervener testimony), presence of cost
of capital testimony supporting the utility's request (i.e., rates of re-
turn were positively related to the extent of supporting testimony), and
the subjective judgment of the commission. It can be conjectured that
the method of regulator selection impacts on the weights attached, by in-
dividual regulators, to these non-capital cost factors.
Eckert (1973) examined the nature of costs and rewards confronting
regulators. His proposition was that regulators have their utility func-
tions shaped by factors such as income, regulatory tenure, post regulatory
employment, personal prestige, and desire to please interest groups. In
this context, regulators have their behavior influenced by factors other
than wealth and incoir.e. While acknowledging that regulators pursue in-
terests including pecuniary and political advantage, Samuels (1973) noted
that different regulators pursue different objectives, which in most cases
are complex and continuously changing.
Russell and Shelton (1974) asserted that the interaction between reg-
ulator utility functions and external forces help explain regulatory be-
havior. The salient elements of regulator utility functions include the
guarantee of a post-regulatory future and long-term political survival.
They formulate behavior models that focus on the distribution of income
between the public utility and consumers, and between user classes. Given
the dominance of the post-regulatory future element, it is posited that
decisions will tend to favor regulated firms, particularly regarding rate
of return. Given the dominance of political survival, decisions will tend
to favor provision of some services at prices below cost to favor politi-
cally powerful consumer groups. Regulatory decisions are essentially the
function of the institutional nature of rate regulation and the regulatory
process.
Gormley (1981) developed a professionalism index, with particular em-
phasis on the method of selecting commissioners. Presuming that the di-
rect election of regulators and increased public participation are alter-
native means to a similar end, he asserted that less public participation
should be associated with states where regulators are elected. In brief,
in states with elected regulatoVs, there is reduced public participation
because the public presumes regulators are more responsive to the public
interest. Al ihougn the empirical evidence tends to support this proposi-
8tion, it is rioted that direct election of regulators may not achieve the
desirable effects it is perceived to have on utility regulation. That is,
in a complex technical area such as public utility regulation, political
activity is not necessarily effective.
In an extensive study of regulatory arrangement, Hagerman and Ratch-
ford (1978) focused on the economic and political variables that can af-
fect rates of return allowed electric utilities. Their results provide
insight on the linkage of regulatory arrangement and regulatory outcome.
As anticipated, economic variables such as risk (measured by debt/equity
ratios), utility size, rate base valuation method, and prevailing inter-
est rates influenced allov/ed rates of return. In addition, terms of com-
missioners were positively related to rates of return, suggesting that
regulators with shorter terms have increased sensitivity to public pres-
sure. The number of commissioners was negatively related (but statisti-
cally insignificant) to rates of return; this did not lend credibility to
the diffusion of responsibility hypothesi s--i .e .
,
for various reasons,
large commissions are better able to shift responsibility for rate of re-
turn decisions than are smaller commissions. Commissioner compensation
was not related to rates of return. Finally, the regulator selection
method emerged as statistically insignificant and with the wrong sign.
This particular result is inconsistent with conventional wisdom that
elected commissioners are more responsive to the public interest than are
appointed commissioners.
ly. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
The objective is to determine the effect of regulatory arrangement
(e.g., commissioner selection method) on electricity rates. Data sources
include the Federal Power (Federal Energy Regulatory) Commission publica-
tions, Statistics for Privately-Owned Electric Utilities and Typical Elec-
tric Bills . The primary statistical technique is multiple regression an-
alysis; three cross-sectional equations are constructed using data for
1967, 1973, and 1979. Joskow (1974) designated 1969 as the switchpoint
in electric utility regulation. Prior to 1969, given minimal inflation
offset by technological innovation and the attainment of economies of
scale, electric utilities requested few rate of return reviews. After
1959, given rapid inflation not counterbalanced by economies of scale and
technological change, there was a substantial increase in rate increase
requests. The use of three cross-sectional regressions should both en-
hance the validity of the empirical results, as well as test the hypothe-
sis that regulatory arrangement had lesser impact on electricity rates in
the era of m.ore passive regulation (prior to 1969) than it has had in the
recent decade of more active regulation.
The sample of 113 privately-owned electric utilities includes only
those utilities that; (1) provide service to industrial and commercial
as well as residential customers, and (2) provide service within a single
state in which there was state regulatory jurisdiction over privately-
owned electric utilities, for the years 1967, 1973, and 1979. In this
sample, 17 electric utilities serve states directly electing commissioners.
States electing commissioners and represented in the sample (with number
of utilities in parentheses) include Alabama (1), Arizona (2), Florida (5),
Georgia (2), Louisiana (3), Mississippi (2), Oklahoma (1), and Tennessee
2
(1). The remaining 95 electric utilities are located in 30 states where
10
regulators are appointed.
The alternative measures of electricity price include three measures
of average electricity price (calculated by dividing revenues for a spe-
cific user class by kwh sales for that class):
average annual residential price (RES)
average annual commercial price (COM)
average annual industrial price (IMD)
as well as seven measures of monthly electricity bills:
Residential Bill for 100 KWH (RES 1)
Residential Bill for 500 KWH (RES 2)
Residential Bill for 1,000 KWH (RES 3)
Commercial Bill for 375 KWH - 3 KW (COM 1)
Commercial Bill for 10,000 KWH - 40 KW (COM 2)
Industrial Bill for 30,000 KWH - 75 KW (IND 1)
Industrial Bill for 400,000 KWH - 1,000 KW (IND 2)
The residential bills represent the typical charges to small, medium, and
large residential consumers. The commercial and industrial bills reflect
3
the charges to small and large commercial and industrial users.
Electricity price was selected as the dependent variable, as opposed
to rate of return. While allowed rate of return is an important indicator
of regulatory influence, the profit measure overlooks several dimensions
of the regulatory process. One, the actual rate of return varies with
whether or not the electric utility is successful in achieving its per-
mitted rate of return. Two, the electric utility may be willing to vio-
late the constraint of the allowed rate of return since the regulatory
agency has limited reaction options. Three, as indicated by Hagerman and
. Ratchford (1973), allowed rates of return are affected primarily by vari-
ables such as utility size, rate-base valuation method, and prevailing in-
11
terest rates; electricity price may be more sensitive to regulatory ar-
rangement and thus v/orth examining. Moreover, as Joskow (1974) noted,
regulators tend to focus on price rather than rate of return.
The regression model includes only supply variables since the pri-
mary objective is to determine if a certain regulatory variable affects
4
the supply price of electricity. The end result is an equation that miore
accurately isolates behavioral ly-induced movements along a demand curve.
Five independent variables are incorporated into the regression model.
Net electric utility plant (SCL) is a measure of system scale. It is pre-
sumed that with increasing scale, generation and transmission economies
occur. Thus, we anticipate SCL to be inversely related to price if these
cost savings are/passed on to electricity consumers. Distribution cost
per kwh sales (DST) involves the most important non-production cost ccm-
ponent for the typical electric utility; this cost measure should reflect
differences in distribution efficiency as well as in market area charac-
teristics (e.g., population density). Given the capital intensive nature
of ihe electric utility industry, we expect DST to be positively related
to price. Tax payments per kwh sales (TAX) reflect a relevant cost in de-
termining the revenue requirements for the electric utility. We antici-
pate the incidence of local, state, and federal taxes to be generally on
the electricity consumer and thus expect TAX to be positively related to
electricity price. Production cost per kwh (PRD) m.easures the most im-
portant cost component for the typical electric utility. It should re-
flect efficiency differences in fuel procurement, fuel utilization, power
purchases, and generation across individual utilities. We expect PRD to
be positively related to price.
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A binary variabl e (REG) "is employed as the measure of regulatory se-
lection--i . e. , the method by v/hich public utility commissioners are se-
lected. Zero values are given to electric utilities located vnthin states
which have directly elected commissioners; values of 1 are assigned to
electric utilities located in states which have appointed comimissi oners.
Information on the method of selection was acquired primarily from the
Federal Power Commission 1957 and 1973 publications, Federal and State
Commission Jurisdiction and Regulation . We anticipate REG to be positively
related to electricity price, hypothesizing that elected regulators are
more sensitive to political pressure than are appointed commissioners.
That is, we presume that elected regulators are subject to direct voter
displeasure on matters of electricity rates. In contrast, decisions of
appointed regulators affect those parties (governor, legislature) that
have appointed them; however, since these selectors are confronted with
numerous election issues, this reduces the importance of regulatory deci-
sions in the electoral process. In this context, elected regulators
should permit lower rate increases than appointed regulators. In brief,
we anticipate this outcome due to the presumption of relatively higher
public opposition to rate increases reflected through directly elected
regulators as compared to the lesser opposition reflected through ap-
pointed regulators.
The price equation is of the form: Y = a + b, SCL + b^ DST + b^ TAX
+ b, PRO + b- REG, in which Y is one of the alternative measures of elec-
tricity price. In general, the analysis seeks to determine the primary
factors influencing electricity price, with particular focus on regulator
sel ection .
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-V. REGULATOR SELECTION AND ELECTRICITY PRICES
In Table 1 are listed the mean values for the variables in our analy-
sis of average electricity prices and electricity bills. The mean statis-
tics clearly show the substantial increases in electricity rates and elec-
tricity production costs that have occurred since 1973. In contrast, the
increases in electricity rates and production costs between 1957 and 1973
were relatively small.
In Table 2 are listed the 1967 regression results for the sample of
privately-owned electric utilities. Distribution costs (DST), tax payments
(TAX), and production costs (PRD) emerged as the most important factors in-
fluencing average electricity prices. All three variables had the antic-
ipated positive sign and were significant at the 99 percent confidence
level. Although the results for the non-regulatory variables are not
listed for the regressions on electricity bills because of economies of
space, they were similar to those results for average price. That is, TAX,
PRD, and DST emerged as significant and positive influences on bills for
all three user classes. The method of regulatory selection (REG) emerged
with the anticipated positive sign only in five of the ten price regres-
sions. In these five regressions, REG was not significant at the 95 per-
cent confidence level; in contrast, in the five regressions where REG
emerged with an unanticipated negative sign, two of the coefficients were
significant (in RES 2 at the 95 percent confidence level; in COM 1 at the
99 percent confidence level). Based on the 1957 data, therefore, there
is little evidence to support the hypothesis that elected regulators have
a constraining effeci;, relative to apoointed regulators, on electricity
14
prices. In fact, there is some evidence in support of the opposite hy-
pothesis.
In Table 3 are listed the regression results from the 1973 data. TAX
and PRO again v/ere important factors influencing average electricity
prices having the anticipated positive signs and being significant at the
99 percent confidence level. SCL had unanticipated positive signs in all
three regressions but was statistically significant in only the residen-
tial regression, thus indicating an association of larger electric utili-
ties with higher average residential prices. The regressions on electric-
ity bills produced similar results; i.e., TAX and PRD were significant in-
fluences on electricity bills for all user classes. REG emerged with the
anticipated positive sign in all regressions except for COM 1 (small com-
mercial bills), and this coefficient was not statistically significant.
REG was significant at the 99 percent confidence level in the regres-
sions on average residential price and large industrial bills; the remain-
ing equations showed no important effects. Based on the 1973 data, there-
fore, there is some evidence that elected regulators have a dampening ef-
fect on electricity prices. That is, electric utilities serving states
having elected public utility commissioners charge lower prices to some
users than do electric utilities serving states having appointed commis-
sioners. However, even though the REG coefficients have in general the
anticipated signs, the coefficients are not associated with consistently
high confidence levels.
In Table 4 are listed the regression results for the 1979 data. Sim-
ilar to prior years, TAX and PRD were the most important variables impact-
ing on average electricity prices; their coefficients had positive signs
15
and were significant at the 99 percent confidence level. SCL was signif-
icant (with unanticipated positive signs) in all three average price re-
gressions. The regi-essions on electricity bills produced similar results,
particularly regarding the important influence of TAX and PRD on electric-
ity rates.
REG efr.erged with the hypothesized positive sign in all ten regres-
sions; and the regulator selection variable was significant at the 99 per-
cent confidence level in the average residential price regression and at
the 95 percent confidence level in RES 3 (large residential bills) and
IMD 2 (large industrial bills). Based-on the 1979 data, therefore, there
is some evidence that elected regulators have a constraining effect on
electricity rates. However, similar to the 1973 results, the REG coeffi-
cients are not associated with consistently high confidence levels.
The somewhat ambiguous results for the regulator selection variable
(REG) deserve further discussion. As Suits (1957) indicated, the dummy
variable is a pragmatic method of incorporating information into a regres-
sion equation that cannot be conventionally measured numerically; and that
some factors, as measured by a binary variable, are more correctly scaled
than many conventionally measured variables. However, one can still have
doubts regarding the validity of dummy variables. That is, does REG m.ea-
sure what it purports to m.easure?
To address the issue of the validity of REG, the authors adopted a
simple test. For the 96 electric utilities in appointed states, 48 util-
ities were randomly selected and the REG variable was reclassified to a
value of zero; the remaining ^3 firms retained the original value of one
for REG. The underlying oremise of this test is that if REG actually re-
16
fleets regulator behavior differing as a function of mode of selection,
the replication of the 30 regressions listed in Tables 2 through 4 should
produce a consistent statistically insignificant relationship betv/een REG
and electricity rates. The actual results show that in only three (one
for each year) of the regressions v/as REG significant at the 95 percent
confidence level, merely reflecting chance outcomes. The replication of
regressions for the appointed sample (using modified values for REG) pro-
duces results that lend validity to REG as a measure of commissioner be-
havior.
VI. CONCLUSION
"
An underlying premise herein is that y^egulators are an important
third party in the regulatory process; they are not simply mediators be-
tv;een producers and consumers. They are an important group motivated by
multiple factors including income and job tenure. Regulators, along with
the producers and consumers, are seeking to achieve certain benefits from
the regulatory-political process. In this context, our focus has been on
the linkage between regulator selection and regulatory outcome.
The regressions employing the 1967, 1973, and 1979 data indicate a
trend in the relationship between the method of regulator selection and
electricity rates. The 1957 data produced no evidence of any constrain-
ing influence on electricity rates by elected regulators, relative to ap-
pointed regulators. The 1973 and 1979 data produced some evidence of a
dampening effect on electricity rates by elected regulators. This trend
over time toward a somewhat stronger association between selection metscd
and electricity rates lends support to the hypothesis that regulatory ar-
17
rangen:ent had a lesser impact on rates in the past era of passive regula-
tion than it has had in the recent decade of more active regulation.
The lack of a consistent and strong association between selection
method and electricity prices can possibly be attributed to two factors.
One, direct election of regulators may have the same apparent effect as
the substitution of public for private ownership of public utilities.
That is, public interest and participation in regulatory matters may de-
crease since consumers may assume (incorrectly in some cases) that elected
regulators will automatically act in their interests. Two, regulators may
not have the flexibility necessary in setting rates to behave as our pri-
mary hypothesis dictates. The discretion of public utility commissioners
is not only circum,scribed by factors outside their control (e.g., energy
prices) but also by legislated administrative procedures and judicial re-
view.
FOOTNOTES
In Illinois, there has been movement to change from appointed pub-
lic utility commissioners to elected regulators ( Chicago Tribune , March 6,
1979). Similarly, in Michigan, there has been pressure for a change from
appointed to elected commissioners ( Lansing State Journal , December 18,
1980). In a Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) hearing be-
fore the West Virginia Public Service Commission involving Appalachian
Power Company, several consumers conveyed belief in the notion that,
"v/here PSC officials are appointed, the rate demands of the electric util-
ities are met; where PSC officials are elected by the public, the rate de-
mands of the electric utilities are rejected." The West Virginia Legis-
lature recently held public hearings on the selection of public utility
commissioners ( Morgantown Dominion-Post , January 21, 1982).
2
In 1967, public utility commissioners were directly elected in 14
states; the same was true for 1973. In the remaining states, commissioners
are appointed by th'3 governor, except in South Carolina and Virginia,
v;here they are appointed by the legislature. The statistics regarding
the number of states with direct elections (14) are somev/hat misleading.
For example, Minnesota made the transition from elected to appointed com-
missioners during the period 1967-1976; by 1976, the Minnesota PSC was
fully composed of appointed comimissioners. Since Minnesota did not com-
mence regulation of electric utilities until January 1975, utilities serv-
ing Minnesota were excluded from our analysis. Similarly, Texas and South
Dakota (elected states) did not initiate regulation of electric utilities
until 1976; electric utilities serving these states were excluded from the
analysis. Nebraska (an elected state) does not have any investor-owned
electric utilities serving the state. Montana and North Dakota (elected
states) were not represented in the sample since no privately-owned elec-
trics serve either of those states exclusively. Finally, Florida changed
from elected to appointed regulators in January 1979. Given the lags in
the rate review orocess. Florida was retained in the elected category for
1979.
3
Typical electric bills for an individual electric utility are re-
corded for each city served. In general, the bills are the same, but
where differences existed, the modal bill was selected.
4
The model was essentially adapted from that employed in a prior
study of political influence and electricity rates (Mann, 1974).
REFERENCES
Eckert, Rcss D. "On the Incentives of Regulators: The Case of Taxicabs."
Public Choice
,
Vol. 19, Spring 1973, pp. 83-99.
Gornley, William T. "Ncnel ectoral Participation as a Response to Issue-
Specific Conditions: The Case of Public Utility Regulation." Social
Science Quarterly
, Vol. 62, September 1981, pp. 527-539.
Hagerman, Robert L. and Brian T. Ratchford. "Some Determinants of Allowed
Rates of Return on Eauity to Electric Utilities." Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics , Vol. 9, Spring 1978, pp. 46-55.
Hilton, George W. "The Basic Behavior of Regulatory Commissions." Ameri-
can Economic Review , Vol. 62, May 1972, pp. 47-54.
Jackson, Raymond. "Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels." Land
Economics , Vol. 45, August 1969, pp. 372-376.
Joskcw, Paul L. "The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a
Formal Regulatory Hearing." Bell Journal of Economics
,
Vol. 3, Autumn
1972, pp. 632-544.
Joskcw, Paul L. "Pricing Decisions of Regulated Firmis: A Behavioral Ap-
proach." Bell Journal of Economics
, Vol. 4, Spring 1973, pp. 118-140.
Joskow, Paul L. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change
in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation." Journal of Law and
Economics , Vol. 17, October 1974, pp. 291-327.
Mann, Patrick C. "User Power and Electricity Rates." Journal of Law and
Economics , Vol. 17, October 1974, pp. 433-443.
Peltzman, Sam. "Toward A More General Theory of Regulation." Journal of
Law and Economics
,
Vol. 19, August 1976, pp. 211-248.
Posner, Richard A. "Taxation by Regulation." Bell Journal of Economics
,
Vol . 2, Spring 1971, pp. 22-50.
Posner, Richard A. "Theories of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of
Economics , Vol. 5, Autumn 1974, pp. 335-358.
Primeaux, Walter J., Jr. and Randy A. Nelson. "An Examination of Price
Discrimination and Internal Subsidization by Electric Utilities."
Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 47, July 1980, pp. 84-99.
Russell, Milton and Roger B. Shelton. "A Model of Regulatory Acencv Be-
havior." Public Choice
. Vol. 20, Winter 1974, pp.'47-62.
Samuels, Warren J. "Public Utilities and the Theory of Power." Persoec-
tives in Public Regulation: Essays on Political Economy , Milton Russell,
Editor. Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press,
1973, pp. 1-27.
Spann, Robert H. "The Regulatory Cobweb: Inflation, Deflation, Regula-
tory Lags, and the Effects of Alternative Administrative Rules in Pub-
lic Utilities." Southern Economic Journal , Vol. 43, July 1975, pp. 827-
0-3Q
Stigler, George J. and Claire Friedland. "What Can Regulators Regulate?:
The Case of Electricity." Journal of Law and Economics , Vol. 5, April
1962, pp. 1-16.
Stigler, George J. "The Theory of Economic Regulation." Bell Journal of
Economics, Vol. 2, Spring 1971, pp. 3-21.
Suits, Daniel B. "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations." Journal
of the American Statistical Association
,
Vol. 52, June 1957, pp. 548-551.
Trebing, Harry M. "Broadening the Objectives of Public Utility Regulation.
Land Economics
,
Vol. 53, February 1977, pp. 106-122.
Trebing, Harry M. "Structural Change and Regulatory Reform in the Utili-
ties Industry." American Economic Review , Vol. 70, May 1980, pp. 383-
392.
Trebing, Harry M. "Equity, Efficiency, and the Viability of Public Utility
Regulation." Applications of Economic Principles in Public Utility In-
dustries , Thomas G. Gies and Werner Sichel , Editors. Ann Arbor, Micni-
gan: Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan,
1981, pp. 17-52.
Table 1
MEANS OF VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN
THE REGULATOR SELECTION ANALYSIS
113 PRIVATELY- OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES
Mean Value
''''''''
1957 1973 1979
Averace Residential Electricity Price
RES (c/KWH)
Averaqe Commercial Electricity Price
COM'(c/KHH)
Averaqe Industrial Electricity Price
IND"(c/!(HH)
Monthly Residential Bill (100 KWfi) -
RES 1 (3)
Monthly Residential Bill (500 KWH) -
RES 2 (S)
Monthly Residential Bill (1,000 KWH) -
RES 3 (S)
Monthly Corrmercial Bill (375 KWH;
3 KW) - COM 1 (S)
I-tonthly Commercial Bill (10,000 KWH;
40 KW) - COM 2 ($)
Monthly Industrial Bill (30,000 KWH;
75 KW) - IND 1 (S)
Monthly Industrial Bill (400,000 KWH;
1,000 KW) - IND 2 (S)
Net Electric Utility Plant - SCL
(bill ions of S)
Distribution Cost - DST (c/KWH)
Tax Expenditures - TAX (c/KWH)
Production Cost - PRD (c/KWH)
2.44 2.65 4.93
2.35 2.58 4.87
1.20 1.52 3.50
4.15 4.80 7.62
10.69 12.50 23.54
18.97 22.08 43.21
14.93 17.23 27.77
240.75 232.28 505.90
500.50 605.71 1224.61
5047.35 6270.39 14,012.10
0.33 0.63 1.12
0.14 0.14 0.19
0.34 0.29 0.33
0.52 0.94 2 . 59
Table 2
ANALYSIS OF REGULATOR SELECTION
PRIVATELY-OWNED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 1957
Rearession Independent Regression Standard T
Variable Coefficient Error Value
I. Average Prices
RES (residential price'
Intercept = 1.089
F Value = 36.39
R^ = .53
N = 113
SCL 0.0909 0.0572 1.59
DST 2.3957* 0.7098 3.37
TAX 1.5935* 0.2401 6.64
PRO 0.5340* 0.1275 4.58
REG 0.1080 0.0786 1.37
COM (commercial price]
Intercept - 1.42
F Value = 15.07
R^ - .41
N - 113
SCL -0.1174 0.0715 -1.64
DST 1.1552 0.8892 1.30
TAX 1.2675* 0.3007 4.22
PRO 0.6610* 0.1597 4.14
REG -0.0175 0.0985 -0.18
IND (industrial price]
Interceot = .32
F Value' = 40.23
R^ - .65
N = 113
SCL 0.0408 0.0377 1.03
DST 1.4404* 0.4587 3.07
TAX 0.8268* 0.1585 5.22
PRD 0.6079* 0.0842 7.22
REG 0.0104 0.0519 0.20
II. Monthly Bills
RES 1 (small residential) REG -0.1469 0.1449 -1.01
2
P. = .35
N = 111
RES 2 (moderate residential) REG -0.6099*^ 0.3155 -1.9:
?
P> = .45
N = 111
Table 2 (Continued) .
Regression
Independent Regression Standard T
Variable Coefficient Error Value
RES 3 (large residential
R^ - .48
N = 111
REG 0.0372 0.53E4 0.16
COM 1 (small ccruTiercial )
r2 = 38
72
REG -1.6837* 0.6882 2.45
COM 2 (large ccfrmercial )
.2
=
.37
= 72
REG 15.6551 9.9713 •1.57
KID 1 (small industrial )
n2
,53
72
REG 0.3130 17.4192 0.0^
INO 2 (large industrial
n2
=
.51
= 72
REG 126.0178 197.5971 0.64
*Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level (one-tailed test)
**Statisticany significant at the 95 percent confidence level (one-tailed test)
Table 3
ANALYSIS OF REGULATOR SELECTION!
PRIVATELY-OWilED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 1973
n^„ „^^-;„„ Independent Regression Standard TRegression
., . , , ^ \j.. . , _ ,. -,
^ Variable Coefficient Error Value
Average Prices
RES (residential price]
Intercept = .97
F Value' = 49.02
R^ = .70
N = 113
.
SCL 0.1198* 0.0351 3.41
DST 0.5252 0.7927 0.66
TAX 2.0035* 0.2650 7.55
PRD 0.7789* 0.0988 7.88
REG 0.2631* 0.0880 2.99
COM (commercial price)
Intercept = 1.17
F Value = 28.88
2
R"^ = .57
N = 113
SCL 0.0326 0.0403 0.31
DST -0.2566 0.9100 -0.23
TAX 1.7488* 0.3042 5.75
PRD 0.8909* 0.1134 7.85
REG 0.1033 0.1010 1.02
IND (industrial price]
Intercept = .11
F Value = 16.25
2
R = .43
N = 113
SCL 0.0709 0.0541 1.31
DST 0.0472 1.2217 0.04
TAX 1.3196* 0.4034 3.23
PRD 0.9832* 0.1523 6.46
REG 0.0694 0.1356 0.51
II. Monthly Bills
RES 1 (small residential) «fg 0.2134 0.1944 1.10
R^ = .33
N =111
RES 2 (moderate residential) REG 0.C671 0.4201
.47
111
R^ =
fable 3 (Continued) .
tegressicn Independent Regression Standard
Variable Coefficient Error Value
RES 3 (large
R^ = .50
N = 111
residential
COM 1 (small
2
R^ = .36
N = 72
cor^mercial )
REG 0.7097 0.6906 1.03
REG 0.2377 0.8452 -0.3^
COM 2 (large conmercial
)
R^ = .50
M = 72
REG 10.0400 12.0433 0.3:
IND 1 (small industrial )
2
R = .59
fl = 72
REG 35.0233 22.8361 1.53
I";D 2 (1 arge industrial )
R^ = .58
fl = 72
REG 710.9151* 295.5507 2.41
'Statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level (one-tailed testl
'Statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level (one-tailed test]
Table 4
ANALYSIS OF REGULATOR SELECTION
PRIVATELY-OWflED ELECTRIC UTILITIES, 1979
Indeoendent Rearession Standard T
Regression
Variable Coe>ficient Error Value
Average Prices
RES (residential price]
Intercept = 1.55
F Value - 74.00
9
R^ =-- .73
ri
--
^ 113
SCL 0.0682** 0.0388 1.76
DST -0.6414 0.6608 -0.97
TAX 2.5101* 0.2415 10.39
PRD 0.7992* 0.0741 10.79
REG 0.4554* 0.1597 2.85
COM (commercial price)
Intercept = 1.78 • SCL 0.0793** 0.0436 1.82
F Value =44.15 DST , -0.3325 0.7411 -0.52
TAX 1.7524* 0.2709 5.47
PRD 0.8313* 0.0831 10.01
113
•
REG 0.2913 0.1791 1.53
R^ = .57
IND (industrial price]
Intercept = .51
F Value = 74.19
R^ = .78
N = 113
SCL 0.0843* 0.0325 2.59
DST -0.2494 0.5548 -0.45
TAX 1.6177* 0.2028 7.98
PRD 0.8252* 0.0522 13.25
REG 0.2078 0.1341 1.55
II. Monthly Bills
RES 1 (small residential) REG 0.4370 0.3754 1.16
R"^ = .37
fl = HI
RES 2 (moderate residential) REG 1.5173 0.9253 1.54
?} = .51
N =111
Table 4 (Continued)
Regression Independent
Regression Standard T
Variable Coefficient Error Value
RES 3 (larae residential
,2
R'-
N
=
.54
= 111
COM 1 (small corrwercial)
R^ = .38
N = 72
REG
REG
3.5308** 1.5853
0.3843 1.4755
2.23
0.25
COM 2 (large commercial)
R = .55
N - 72
REG 28.8184 20.3429 1.42
KID 1 (small industrial )
R^ = .59
N = 72
REG 60.9810 56.2168 1.08
HID 2 (large industrial )
R^ = .53
M = 72
n r- ^ 1515.4150** 580.0447 2.23
*Statisticany significant at the 99 percent confidence level (one-tailed test)
'*Statisticany significant at the 95 percent confidence level (one-tailed test)
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